

/ Doc # 550

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Rejected*

Military Strategy of the Chung-ping  
Army Against Japan, Volume I.

Text of Chiang Kai-shek's instructions  
Concerning military affairs

Extracts of instructions given at the  
opening of Liu-chow Military Conference  
(Part I) (22 Feb. 29th year of Chinese  
Republic (1940)

*Boyd RB  
Yamamoto  
Brinkley  
Kootz  
Carr  
Hara  
Hornet Joff*

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Today, at the opening of the Conference, I shall inform you of two kinds of important documents which we obtained from the enemy.

One is the enemy's proclamation secured at Chuitang, that is, text entitled "Return of Chuitang." The original text says, "This operation broke out with a concentrated attack by Chiang's troops against ours stationed in Chuitang. Our troops, herefore, grasped opportunities and planned a large scale counter-attack operation. During the operation lasting more than fifty days, a few battalions dispatched to Chuitang fiercely fought with Chiang's troops of more than ten divisions. We shall fully express our respect toward Chiang's forces in the said district who were bravest compared with those in other districts. It was indeed praise worthy that our small forces, when compared in number with the enemy forces so doggedly resisted the large enemy forces and thus heightened our bravery of martial glory in the eyes of the outside world.

Our forces, since the strong defence of Chuitang, have successfully accomplished our purpose of smashing the enemy's schemes. Now we are going to retrocede Chuitang to Chiang's forces. In conclusion, we praise the bravery of the tens of thousands of Japanese and Chinese deceased or injured in the neighbourhood of Chuitang and we heartily pray the blessing for them".

Most of you must have already read this proclamation. What are your impressions about it?

I presume you were deeply moved and caused to make a profound

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re-examination of yourselves. The contents of the proclamation itself are, of course, exceedingly arrogant and full of contempt towards us; however, all our officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers should make sufficient study of it and should always keep this in mind.

The second document we obtained is the "Textbook for officers and soldiers" compiled by the Military Dept. of the enemy's Imperial General Staff Hq. All of you are required to study the book. You should fully realize that we have not been able to estimate or judge the enemy, as we had not obtained any of his documents in peace time.

Now I shall re-read the table of the contents of "Text-book for Officers and Soldiers" (Chief Committee read the full text of the table of the contents).

Next I shall make a few explanations of the contents. First, the preface's paragraph 20 of Volume I. is indeed worthy of our study and reflection I shall explain, in the following each of the paragraphs of the original text.

8. As to paragraph 14 of the original text reading, "Do not be discouraged when injured," there appears a detailed explanation in my instructions in "Model of Resistance" and in "Never Retire When Injured" of "Bandit warfare". As to paragraph 15 reading, "Respect the war deceased and the injured", we must especially keep this sentence in mind. A recent enemy's radio broadcast said that, "We have retired from Chuitang after having performed a memorial service for the war dead".

Here it is disclosed how lofty the spirit of the enemy is. PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1a78fc/>

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Although at present it is not quite as high as it usually is, the enemy always retires after having removed the war dead and the severely injured from positions. He thinks it a great shame if he has not done this. This time, in this aspect, it is not quite as perfect; however, before he retreated the enemy used to perform a mourning service for the war deceased. A commanding officer takes full charge of a service and observes it very politely. I shall question you. For example, what actual circumstances exist before you commanding officers retreat? Have you ever thought of those war-dead or injured officers and soldiers in the battlefield? Our Chinese army, in the outward appearance looks the same as those of other countries, however, we are inferior to the enemy in these points, that is, in fighting spirit and in morality, we should, hereafter, try to diffuse both of the above two principles among our subordinates in the battle field. That is when retiring, our commanding officers should perform a memorial service for the war-dead. Those who are to die later should console the souls of those who have already died. But this must not degenerate into formality such as to observe it with mere attendance of officers and soldiers in general. You Commanding officers who have the power of life and of death, and disposal must accept full responsibility for the death and injury of your subordinates, of keeping that responsibility in mind observe services with heartfelt sincerity and respect. Also, read an announcement as though you are actually facing the souls of the dead officers and soldiers, consoling their souls by swearing your death at the war front. By

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doing this, you would indeed be praised for having respected the war deceased officers and soldiers. For this reason you should not underestimate the enemy's proclamation of "Return of Chuitang," as an ordinary document. As I have mentioned before the enemy performed services and consoled the souls not only of Japanese soldiers but also of Chinese deceased in the neighbourhood of Chiutang. Knowing this, do you not feel remorseful?

#### Appendix

HO YING-CHIN's study of war circumstances and Request to Staff Students.

Note 1. This is the full text of instructions made on 15 Apr. 1941 by HO YING-CHIN, Chief of the General Staff and the Military Government Dept, to each chief administrator (T.N. not clear) and students when he inspected the 4th body of the Wartime Construction Staff Training Group of Sean's Military Affairs Committee (The Group was presided over by Chiang Kai-shek). This text was translated from "CHAN KAN No 147" (4, May of 30th year by Chinese Republic calendar) (TN 1941) published by the political dept of the said group.

(p. 153)

Next, I shall lecture on the strategy employed by ourselves and by the enemy during the 1st term period of the resistance war. The Enemy's strategy during this period was "sudden attack quick results" and "swift peace, swift agreement", because the enemy nation is limited in population, lacks resources, and her only

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dependence in carrying out the China invading operation is the well-equipped military strength numbering several tens of thousands. The enemy presumed, at the break of the war, that he would be able to terminate the war in a short period by smashing our field forces with his powerful military strength. However, our operational policies frustrated the enemy's strategy, that is to say at the head of the war, our high ranking officers of officials firmly agreed upon an all-out resistance by applying the principles of a war of attrition so as to smash the enemy's illusion of "sudden attack, quick decisions". On this point, during the first term period of the resistance war, in any conference large or small, we had tried to delay for time, to avoid a final decisive combat with the enemy, and to enlarge the operational zone to which we induced the enemy's forces in order to bring his strength to saturation. On the one hand, we connived at delaying for time and planned the consumption of the enemy's strength and on the other, we expected to enlarge and replenish our own military strength. In a few words the enemy's strategy during the 1st term period of the resistance war was "sudden attack" "quick decisions", of ours, a all-out resistance and the consumption of the enemy's power, or "delaying action." (p 156)

Our high ranking military officers fully realized that the enemy's power to attack had reached its maximum since the WUCHANG-HANKOW operation, and convened the first supreme military affairs conference at HAN YUEH, at which time, confirming that the resistance had moved from its first term period to its second, decided the

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strategy for the 2nd term resistance and decided to assume the initiative in the war. Since then, through the enemy continued its attack against us, we have gradually gained the initiative. Such strategy is designed to thrust at the enemy's weak points and reduce its power. We, at the same time, paid attention to an operation behind the enemy infiltrating troops into the enemy's rear and attacking them with the co-operation of the soldiers and the people of the area. Thus we have enlarged the operational zone and have besieged the enemy forces in each occupied territory with our soldiers and people. That is, the enemy forces were unable to carry out a large scale attack with any concentration of his military strength. Our troops, meanwhile, continued its attack against the enemy in every battlefield inflicted great losses daily rendering him unable to replenish provisions and ammunitions. Parallel with the continuance of operation, we continuously transferred our troops to the rear for recreation and training. In other words we divided all the armed forces into three parts at that time. One was to cause disturbances in enemy occupied territories, the second was to fight against the enemy at the front and the last was to be transferred to the rear to receive supplementary training. Due to the rapid changes in international relations we could not rely upon foreign countries for the supply of munitions. Therefore, we established arsenals in various places in the rear mainly to manufacture arms and ammunitions necessary for the execution of the resistance. The operational power was reinforced and everything was in readiness to deliver a hard blow to the enemy at the first

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opportunity. The above strategy is what our high ranking officer agreed upon and called "General strategy". With the application of this strategy, in less than two years, the enemy's invading forces were caught deep in a mire from which they could not withdraw. This had caused a sort of an agglutinative situation within the enemy in each of the occupied territories at present.

Therefore during the 2nd term of the resistance war, our forces have gained a decided advantage on the point of military strategy. Since the second term resistance broke out our forces have constantly been on initiative and have been harassing the enemy both at the front and in the rear. According to statistics from Jan. (1928 of the 28th year) to Jan. of this year the number of combats, regular or guerilla, totaled 17, 681. Since so many combats occurred within a span of just two years fighting has broken out in various districts of our large Chinese Mainland. The enemy was too exhausted to do anything except to sit tight and receive our attacks and suffer losses. Thus the enemy's secret plan of "foster war with war" was completely smashed. That is, operational losses have been exceedingly great and difficulties in the distribution of military strength have arisen. The enemy continues to mobilize in the homeland and is barely able to send its surviving combatants back to the homeland for recuperation.

#### Appendix

2. Changes in the battle tactics of forces both friendly and enemy in the Sino-Japan Incident by FAI CHUNG-HSI

(Assistant Chief of staff)

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NOTE 1. This information is a translation of "Changes of Friendly and Enemy Military Tactics in the Resistance War", appearing in the 4th term of the "Monthly of Military Staff College Staff Officers" (published 1 Dec. 30th year of Chinese Republic) (T.N. 1941) compiled by the north western section, of the staff sec. of the enemy's Military staff College.

2. Change to Guerilla Warfare.

In the Shansi area, since the fall of TAIYUAN and LINEEN, our military tactics have gradually changed from the pure regular tactics to the mixture of the guerilla one. The so called name "guerilla tactics" was generally known then, however, no one had adopted it when we look into the history of guerilla tactics in Russia it was called "Partisan" and was employed during her war against Sweden in the 17th century by using cavalry men to break the enemy's long communication lines. In 1812 at the time of Napoleon's expedition into Russia, the French forces were defeated after having been greatly harassed by guerilla tactics of the Russian army. The tactics especially revealed its effectiveness in the Soviet's revolutionary war. Also these tactics were employed in the Franco-Prussian War and in the Civil War in the United States. In Shansi when the enemy commenced attacks on the TATUNG-PUCHOW line, FENGLING-TU and CHUNTU, the General Staff Hqs, decided on the employment of the guerilla tactics. The gist of operational orders given to the 2nd operation zone were as follows:

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I. Shansi is the fortress of North China and the important

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liaison line of the whole front, and its loss would have a profound effect. For this very reason, it shall never be forsaken. We have already ordered the HOFANG force to defend it at all cost. If any one attached to 2nd operations zone ever crosses the river and retreats without an order, he will be shot to death, regardless of the official rank he possesses.

2. Each force shall deploy a dispersed formation with a division of brigade as a unit and for a while shall only perform guerilla tactics, avoiding the regular.

3. Retreat shall not be directed towards HONAN or HOSE but to the east or north which means the enemy's rear. At that time the enemy was preparing large-scale tactics intending to deal in a heavy blow, and before the arrival to LINFEN, in a propaganda broadcast said, "We are again set to accomplish a 'Tannenberg' annihilation." In view of the situation prevailing, this enemy's plan was not entirely impossible. It takes three hours at least to cross and recross the Yellow River. It was feared that the crossing of the river by a large force of several hundred thousand may cause confusion and collapse not only by the presence of the enemy but by our own forces' struggle for boats. The supreme command hqs, therefore, planned to secure its positions before the reverse and the tactics of our army were changed in this occasion of course at the very beginning, guerilla tactics were discussed, however, no one ever employed them. It was because the majority of the commanders were those who had only acquired the technique of regular tactics. Retreat in the regular tactics

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is directed at right angle to the front, while in the guerilla one it is directed to the enemy's back without any definite direction, which can not be expected in the former tactics. In the regular tactics attack is possible only when powerful forces are available. It says in an old Chinese military book "Encircle when it is ten. Attack when it is five", however, guerilla forces, do not require powerful military strength and are able to attack an enemy force of one division with friendly forces of one requirement, one battalion, or one company or sometimes with one platoon or one squad. These are revolutionary tactics. It would have been impossible for us to fight, at that time, had we observed only the regular tactics. According to my point of view, in the transference from regular combat to guerilla, we are requested to exhibit a force revolutionary spirit. Only then can we expect to effectively utilize these revolutionary tactics. In the regular tactics, military strength, equipment and nature are required to be equally furnished, though in the revolutionary tactics this is not always so: What we are executing to-day is a racial revolutionary war and a special kind of revolutionary tactics should naturally be employed "Cavalry men in Chinese strategy conforms to "small combat" in German strategy such tactics as cavalrymen" or "small combat" necessarily appear in Shansi. Change methods when perplexed, these changes open paths these openings permit eternal hope which is the nearest thing to being divine. Military science also is not fixed and unchangeable such things as tactics are extremely flexible

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according to time and place. YUEH WU MU said, "It is the way of military strategy to fight after setting positions. The beauty operation exists in ones soul "The existence of famous Chinese generals of olden times is not limited to YUEH WU MU. SUN PIN defeated WEI's soldiers by diminishing the number (TN-purposely lessening food nations) of ovens YU HSU defeated the named tribes by increasing the number of (TN-increasing food nations) ovens. In CHINGCHING, HAN HSIN gained victory after having set a position with the river in the back such as to place his troops into the jaws of death MA SU was defeated in KAI TING after having set a position such as to place his troops into the jaws of death. These are all special examples of military strategy and prove the changes in military strategy with the passage of time. It was because Napoleon, according to situations, reformed and renovated the antiquated 18th century military tactics that in the beginning he won every battle he fought. It was because other countries such as England and Germany gradually realized the necessity of the reformation of their tactics that in late years he was defeated. At present we are not applying guerilla tactics in all the war fronts. At the NAN YUEH Conference (TN: conference in which the way of the 2nd term resistance was determined) it was decided that one third of the military strength would be put in occupied territories to perform guerilla combats, another one-third to be set in the front of CANTON-HANKOW line to resist the enemy, and the remaining third to remain in the rear to be trained and reoriented. In the instruction of the

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Chief committee at HAN YUEH Conference it says "Guerilla combat superior to regular combat." Its real meaning resides not attaching a great importance merely to guerilla combat. He tried to draw the people's attention to guerilla combat to plan effective use of the original rules of the regular tactics skilfully combined with guerilla tactics.

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Certificate for Source of Document

I, BANNO, Junichi, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 221 pages of entitled "MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE CHUNG KING ARMY AGAINST JAPAN, Volume I," compiled by the Military Dept. of the Imperial General Staff Headquarters was obtained in Tokyo in 1943 and has been kept by the undersigned.

Signed at Tokyo on this 19th of Dec. 1946

Banno Junichi

I, OKAMOTO, Toshio, certify that the above signature and sealing was done in my presence.

At the same place on the same day

Witness: Okamoto Toshio

Translation Certificate.

I, RICHARD Yonehiro, of the Defence Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Sgt. Richard Yonehiro

Tokyo, Japan  
Date 28 Jan, 1947.

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文書ノ出所ニ關スル證明書

本書ニ添付セル日本語ニテ書カレタル二百二十一頁ヨリ成ル大本管區軍部著重慶軍ノ封日戰法第一編ト題スル書籍ハ一九四三年東京ニ於テ入手シ爾來自分ニ於テ藏置セル書類ナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十一年十二月十二日 於東京

阪 埜 吉  
*Ganno* *fuuchiki*

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

同日 於 同所

立會人 岡 本 敏 男

「重慶軍ノ對日戰法第一編」  
蔣介石ノ軍事ニ關スル訓令

昭和十七年五月二十日  
大本營陸軍部

拔粹

「柳州軍事會議開會訓詞」(其ノ二) (民國二十九年二月二十二日讀) 拔粹

第一、我ガ軍ガ過去ニ於テ最モ敵ニ輕視セラレタル一點ハ即チ陣歿官兵ノ遺骸ハ多クハ管ニ收容安葬シ能ハザルノミナラズ之ヲ陣地ニ遺棄シ戰場ニ曝屍フルコトハ我ガ軍ノ最大ナ弱點ニシテ又我々長官ノ最大ナル恥辱デアル。此ノコトハサテ措キ只敵ニ斯クノ如キ狀況ヲ見セルコトノミニ就テ云フモ我ガ軍ノ心理ヲ輕視シ我々ヲ殺レズ單ニ我ガ軍ノ士氣ノ上ニ於テ一大弱點ヲ敵ニ暴露スルノミナラズ我々ノ忠勇將士ガ國ノ爲ニ犧牲トナリ竟ニ死ニ至ツテモ其ノ骨ヲ收ムル能ハズシテ我々後ニ死スルモノガ如何ニシテ先ニ死シタルモノニ對シ顔ヲ合ハスコトガ出來ヨウカ更ニ何ノ面目アツテ人々ニ見エルコトガ出來ヨウカ、我々ハ今日此ノ驛ヲ知ツタ各總司令官各軍師長ハ即チ徹底的三ツノ改進方法ヲ講ジ、今後戰地上ノ總テノ陣歿官兵ノ遺骸ハ必ズ收容掩埋シ狀況ガ如何ニ困難、危險ナリトモ必ズ部下ヲ督勵シテ眞面目ニ之ヲ爲シ

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遂グベキデアル、特ニ各級官兵ニハ同僚ガ戦場ニ於テ犠牲トナリ其ノ遺  
 骸ヲ收容埋葬スルコトガ出来ナイコトハ我々ノ最大恥辱ニシテ又最大  
 ノ罪惡デアルコトヲ知ラネバナラナイ、我々ニハ良心的ニ方法ヲ盡シ  
 我々ノ戦友ヲ收容埋葬シ戦場ヲ清掃スル責任ヲ盡スベキデアル、現在  
 敵ハ火葬方法ヲ用ヒテ屍ルガ我々ニハ擔架隊ノ外ニ尙殘埋除ヲ設ケ、  
 毎師或ハ毎團ニ一組ヲ設ケ職責ヲ規定シ、命令ヲ以テ施行スベキデア  
 ル、又前線ニ於テハ棺材ガ缺乏セル場合ニハ極力方法ヲ講ジ土ヲ掘ッ  
 テ死體ヲ埋葬シ墳上ニ標誌ヲ挿シ死者ノ姓名ヲ明記シ、陣歿將士ノ英  
 靈ヲ安ラカニスベキデアル、我ガ國ノ俗語ニ「死シテ身ヲ葬ムル所無  
 シ」ト云フ言葉ガアルガ之ハ人世ノ最モ悲惨ナ境地ヲ形容シタモノデ  
 若シ我々ガ陣歿同胞ノ遺骸ヲ埋葬スル能ハズ之ヲ原野ニ暴露スルニ任  
 セル様ナコトヲセバ死者トシテ考ヘレバ死シテ葬身ノ地ナキモノデ如  
 何ニ悲惨ナコトデアラウカ、我々長官トシテ已ニ死シタル將士ニ對シ  
 合ハセル顔ガアラウカ、未ダ死セザル官兵ガ之ヲ見テ如何ナル感想ヲ  
 抱クデアラウカ、士氣ニ及ボス影響ノ大ナルコトハ之ニ過グルモノハ

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ナカラウ、依ツテ我々ハ今後作戰部隊ニ對シテハ絕對ニ陣歿官兵ノ遺  
 骸ヲ陣地ニ遺棄スル事ヲ禁ジ、必ズ適切ナル方法ヲ盡シ埋葬ノ責任ヲ  
 果タサスベキデ即チ情勢ガ非常ニ緊急デ收容スル暇ナキ時ニハ陣地周  
 近ニ適當ニ埋葬スベキデアル、本件ハ作戰兵士ノ士氣ニ關スル所故モ  
 重大ナレバ各位ガ十分注意シ眞面目ニ實行セラルル事ヲ希望スル、各  
 師團ノ政訓處長ハ殊ニ擔架隊、掩埋隊ノ指揮ノ責任ヲ持テ責任觀念ト  
 忠義觀念ヲ發揮シテ適切ニ職務ヲ遂行セラルル様セラレタイ、  
 中 略

柳州軍事會議開會訓詞（其ノ一）民國二十九年二月二十二日（略）ヨリ發祥

本日大會開幕ノ勞頓ニ際シ、予ハ先ツ吾人ガ最近敵側ヨリ取得セル兩  
 種重要文件ニ就キ各位ニ報告スベシ

第一ノ文件ハ九地ニ於テ得タル敵側佈告、即チ「還還九地」ノ一又ナ  
 リ、原文ニ曰ク

「今次作戦ハ九地派遣ノ我ガ軍隊ニ對シ將軍總集攻撃セルニ發端ス、  
 依ツテ我ガ軍ハ戰機ヲ把握シ一大反擊作戰實施ヲ企圖セリ、其ノ  
 間五十餘日該地派遣ノ我ガ數箇大隊ハ將軍十餘箇師ト一大激戦ヲ

ヲ演ゼリ、此ノ地區ニ於ケル蔣軍ガ他方面ニ比シ最モ勇敢ナリシハ我  
ガ軍ノ敬意ヲ表スルニ寄ナラザル所トス、敵ニ於テ比、較、スルニ、極、少、ハ  
我、ガ、軍、ガ、堅、忍、克、ク、敵、大、軍、ニ、拮、抗、シ、皇、軍、ノ、武、威、ヲ、中、外、ニ、宣、揚、セ、ル、ハ、誠、ニ  
絶、讃、ニ、値、ス

我ガ軍ハ九塘駐守以來蔣軍ノ企圖紛碎ノ目的ヲ達成セルヲ以テ茲ニ九  
塘ヲ蔣軍ニ壁還ス、最後ニ吾人ハ九塘附近日華兩軍數萬死傷者ニ對シ  
其、ハ、武、勳、ヲ、稱、シ、且、其、ハ、冥、幅、ヲ、祈、ル、

此ノ佈告ハ諸子モ概ネ閱讀セシテランモ各位ノ感想是シテ如何？惟フニ  
諸子ノ心中必ズヤ多大ノ感慨ト深刻ナル反省トヲ喚起セラレシナルベシ！  
勿論彼ノ佈告ハ其ノ内容甚ダ驕傲ニシテ我レヲ輕侮スルノ氣焔滿々タル  
モノ有リト雖モ、我ガ全軍上下士兵ハ本佈告ノ内容ニ就キ十分ナル反省  
ヲ爲シ以テ嚴戒セザルベカラズ！

第二ノ文件ハ我ガ方ニテ獲得セル敵側大本營陸軍部編纂ノ「士兵須知」  
ニシテ、本冊ハ諸子全體ノ研究ヲ必要トス、汝等知ルベシ！平時我等ハ  
敵側文件ヲ獲得シ得ザリシ爲敵ニ對スル判決不能ナリキ、

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中 略

今再ビ敵側「士兵須知」ノ目錄ヲ朗讀スベシ（委員長目錄全文朗讀）  
次ニ其ノ内容ニ就キ若干説明ス、先ツ其ノ第一編緒言二十節ハ甚ダ吾人  
ノ研究及反省ニ値ス、以下其ノ原文ニ就キ分邊説明スベシ

中 略

八、原書第十四節「負傷ノ場合ト雖モ意氣沮喪スベカラズ」ノ一點ニ關  
シテハ予ノ「抗戰手本」及「剿匪手本」中ノ「受傷不退」ノ訓示中ニ  
詳細ナル説明アリ、其ノ第十五節「戰死傷者ヲ尊敬スベシ」ノ一文ハ  
我々トシテモ特ニ留意ガ肝要ナリ、最近ノ敵側「ラデオ」放送ニ曰ク、  
「我等ハ九塘ニテ慰靈祭執行ノ後始メテ撤退セリ」ト！

以テ敵軍精神ノ如何ニ高潔ナルカヲ知ルベシ、現在ニ於テハ若干見劣  
リスルモ、從來敵側ハ陣地ノ屍體及重傷者ヲ必ズ收容シテ露還シ、之  
ニ反セバ一大恥辱ト心得アリ、現在ハ此ノ點安全トハ謂ヒ難キモ毎次  
撤退ニ際シテハ招魂祭ヲ執行シ、司令官自ラ喪主ト爲リテ叮重告祭シ

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然ル後撤退ヲ開始ス、試ニ問フ「女等指揮官退却前ノ状況如何？汝等ハ現地陣歿ノ將士及傷兵ヲ一處ニテモ同顧セシ事アリヤ？我が中國軍隊ハ外面上他國軍隊ト同一ノ観アルモ、只此ノ一點即チ將兵ノ戰鬪精神及情義ニ於テ遠ク敵軍將兵ニ及バズ？以後我方万トシテモ戰場ノ下ニ對シ此ノ精神及道義ヲ普及セシムベシ、即チ凡ソ退却ニ際シテハ我が司令官ハ必ズ招魂祭ヲ執行シ一般陣歿將士ノ英靈ヲ祭リ、後ヨリ死スベキ者ノ心ヲ盡シテ既ニ死セル者ノ靈魂ヲ慰安スベシ、然レドモ這ハ徒ラニ形式ニ墮シ一般士兵ノ參觀ニ供シテ終リト爲スガ如キハ不可ナリ、女等司令官一生殺戮泰ノ制限ヲ有スル者一ハ、部下將兵ノ死傷ニ對シ負責シ其ノ責任觀念ニ立脚シテ死者ニ對シ至誠至敬ノ赤心ヲ捧ゲ以テ祭務ヲ執行セヨ」又告文朗讀ノ際ハ、將士ノ靈魂ト眞ニ面接スルノ思ヒヲ以テ臨ミ後死ヲ誓ツテ英靈ヲ慰ムベシ！斯クシテ始メテ眞ニ陣歿將士ヲ尊敬セリト稱シ得ベシ！斯ルガ故ニ敵軍「壁邊九堵」ノ佈告ハ之ヲ普通文ト見做シ略視スベキニ非ズ、即チ上述セル如ク敵側ハ九堵附近ノ日本軍隊歿將士ノミナラズ我が中國軍隊ノ戰歿將士

PURB <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1a78fc/>

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DEF DOC # 300

ヲモ同様告祭慰撫セルモノナリ、汝等之ヲ視テ慚愧無キヤ？！

REF DOC # 350

「何應欽ノ抗戰形勢ノ檢討ト幹部學生ニ對スル希望」抜粋

駐

一、本訓詞ハ昭和十六年四月十五日參謀總長兼軍政部長何應欽ガ在西安軍事委員會戰時工作幹部訓練團第四團（團長蔣介石ノ兼任）ヲ檢閲ニル際各官長、學生ニ爲セル全文ニシテ該團政治部編印「戰幹」第一七號（民三〇、五、四）ニ所載セルヲ譯出セルモノナリ

中  
略

「在西安軍事委員會戰時工作幹部訓練團各官長、學生ニ對スル何應欽ノ訓詞

（昭和十六年四月十五日）ヨリ抜粋

次ニ第一期抗戰期間中ニ採用セル彼我ノ戰略ニ就キ講述スベシ  
本期間ニ於ケル敵側戰略ハ「速戰速決」、「速和速結」ニ在リ、何トレハ敵國ハ人口ニ限度有リ且資源缺乏シ其ノ侵襲作戰ニ於テ恃ム所ハ其ノ裝備良好ナル數十萬ノ兵力ノミナレバナリ、開戰當時敵側ハ此ノ勢ナル兵力ヲ以テ我ガ野戰軍ヲ擊滅シ短期間内ニ戰爭ヲ終結セシメ得ベシト思惟セリ、之ニ對シ我ガ方ノ作戰方針ハ敵戰略ノ裏ヲカキ、開戰ト

DEF DOC 550

共ニ我ガ最高指揮ハ徹底抗戦ノ決意ヲ爲シ敵ノ速戰速決ニ對スルニ消耗戰ヲ以テシ、敵側速戰速決ノ迷夢ヲ打破スルニ決セリ、斯カル原則ニ立脚シ第一期抗戰期間中ニハ大小ヲ論ゼズイザレノ會議ニ在リテモ我ガ軍ハ時間ヲ延引シ而モ敵トノ最後の決戦ヲ回避シ作戰區域ヲ最大限ニ擴張シ敵軍ヲ誘導シテ敵兵力ヲ飽和狀態ニ達セシメ、一面敵兵力ノ消耗ヲ圖リ他面時間ノ延長ヲ策シ、反面自己兵力ノ培養補充ヲ期セリ、總之、第一期抗戰期間中ニ於ケル敵ノ戰略ハ速戰速決ニ在リ、我ガ方戰略ハ抗戰

中 略

我ガ方軍事最高當局ハ武漢會戰後敵側進攻力盡訖ニ最高點ニ達セルヲ看做シ南線ニ第一次最高軍事會議ヲ召集シ、抗戰ハ第一期ヨリ第二期ニ移行セルヲ確認シ第二期抗戰ノ戰略ヲ決定、主動ノ爭取ニ努力スルニ決セリ、以後敵ハ我ガ方ニ對スル進攻ヲ繼續セルモ我ガ方ハ漸次主動ノ地位ニ立ツヲ得タリ、斯カル戰略ハ敵軍弱點ヲ衝キ其ノ優勢ヲ滅殺スルヲ企圖セルモノニシテ、我ガ方ハ同時ニ敵後方ノ作戰ニ留意シ部隊ヲシテ敵

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1a78fc/>

LIF DOC # 550

後方ニ深入セシメ後方軍民ト協力敵ヲ襲撃シ、作戰地區ヲ擴大シテ各占領地區内敵軍ヲシテ我が軍民ノ重圍ニ陥ラシメタリ、即チ敵ハ隨時隨地ニ牽制セラレ兵力ヲ集中シテノ大規模ノ攻撃ヲ實施スルヲ得ズ、各戰場ニ於テハ、我が軍ハ敵ニ對シ不斷ノ攻撃ヲ加ヘ敵ヲシテ日毎ニ損害有ラシメ、又其ノ糧食、彈藥ノ補給ヲ不能ニ陥レ、一面作戰ヲ繼續スルト共ニ他面 我が部隊ヲ輪番ニ後方ニ移動セシメ休養訓練セシメタリ、約言スレバ當時全國部隊ハ三部ニ分レ、一部ハ敵占領地區内ニテ後方擾亂ニ任ジ一部ハ前線ニ在リテ敵ト對峙交戦シ、一部ハ後方ニ移動セシメテ補訓セルナリ、國際關係ノ變化甚ダシキ爲一切ノ軍需品ハ之ヲ外國ノ支給ニ俟ツヲ得ズ、依テ後方各地ニ多數ノ兵工廠ヲ設立シ専ラ抗戰所要ノ武器彈藥ヲ製造シ部隊ノ作戰力量ヲ増強シ機ニ乘ジ敵ニ一大打撃ヲ與フベク準備セリ、如上ノ戰略ハ即チ我が最高領袖自ラ決定セル所關「全面戰略」ナルモノナリ、此ノ種戰略ノ運用二箇年ニ達セザルニ敵軍侵華部隊ハ全部泥沼中ニ陷入シ自拔不能！ナレリ、目下各占領地區内敵軍ガ一種ノ膠着狀態ヲ呈シアルハ即チ此處ニ基因スルナリ

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1a78fc/>

DEF DOC # 350

サレバ第二期抗戰中歩兵軍ハ戰略上偉大ナル收穫ヲ舉ゲタリ、第二期抗  
戰開始以來我が軍ハ敵ノ前方及後方ニ於テ絶エズ攻勢ヲ採レルガ、二十  
八年一月乃至本年一月ニ至ル間ノ統計ニ據レバ正規戰及遊撃戰ノ交戰回  
數計一萬七千六百八十一回ノ多キニ達セリ、僅カ二箇年間ニ斯クモ多數  
ノ戰鬪行ハレシ爲メ敵ハ廣大ナル中國領土上ノ各地ニ發生シ、敵ハ奔  
ニ疲レ爲ス所ヲ知テズ、徒ラニ坐シテ我が方ニ依ル襲撃ト消耗ヲ甘受ス  
ルニ至レリ、斯クテ敵ノ意圖セル「以戰養戰」ノ陰謀ハ完全ニ粉碎セラ  
レタリ、即チ作戰上ノ消耗大ナル爲兵力ノ分配ニ困難ヲ來シ止ム。得ズ  
國內ニ於ケル動員ヲ續行シ辛ウジテ作戰殘餘部隊ノ歸還休養ヲ可能ナラ  
シメタリ

「白崇禧（參謀副長）ノ日支戰ニ於ケル彼我戰法ノ變遷」抜粹

註

一、本情報ハ敵陸軍大學校參謀班西北班（在西安）主編ノ「陸大參謀月刊」第四期（民三〇、一二、一出版）所載「抗戰中敵我戰法的演變」ノ譯出ナリ

中 略

二、游擊戰法ヘノ變遷

山西方面ニ在リテハ太原臨汾陷落後我等ノ戰法ハ漸ク純正規戰ヨリ游擊戰法混用ニ轉ジ、當時一般ニ游擊戰ナル名稱ハ知ラレシモ之ヲ深摺實施セルモノ無カリシナリ、游擊戰法ヲ歴史的ニ檢討スルニ、歐西亞ニ於テ之ヲ「バルチザン」ト稱シ十七世紀ニ於ケル對瑞典戰爭ニ騎兵ヲ利用シ遠隔ノ敵交通線ヲ破壞セル游擊戰術ヲ行ヘリ、一八一二年「ナポレオン」ノ露西亞遠征ノ際佛軍ハ露軍ノ游擊戰ニ憊マサレ遂ニ敗北セリ「ソウイェット」革命戰ニ於テ特ニ其ノ威力ヲ發揚シ、其ノ他普

REF ID: A6350

戦争、「アメリカ」南北戦争ニ於テモ此ノ戦法ガ用ヒラレタリ、  
 ニ於テ敵ガ同藩線及風陵渡並ニ軍渡ヲ攻撃ノ際大本營ハ游撃戦法ノ  
 用ヲ決意セルガ、其ノ際第二戦區ニ對シ下セル作戰命令ノ要旨次ノ如  
 (一) 山西ハ奉北ノ要塞ニシテ全戰線ノ紐帶タレバ之ガ得失ハ其ノ影響  
 スル所極メテ大ナルモノアルヲ以テ斷ジテ放棄スルヲ得ズ、現ニ河  
 部隊ニ對シ死守ヲ下令シタルガ、第二戰區所屬部隊ニシテ命令ヲ俟  
 ズシテ渡河退却スルモノアラバ其ノ所屬官等級ノ如何ヲ問ハズ一律ニ  
 銃殺ス

(二) 各部隊ハ分散隊形ヲ取り師又ハ旅ヲ以テ單位トシ、當分ノ間正統  
 戦ヲ避ケ游撃戦ノミ行フベシ

(三) 退却方向ハ河南又ハ河西ニ向フコト無ク、後軍後方タル東方又ハ  
 北方ニ向フベシ當時敵ハ錐形戦法ヲ準備シテ我ニ大打撃ヲ與ヘンモノ  
 ト企圖シ、臨カ到著ニ先立チ「今次又々「タンネンベルグ」大殲滅戰  
 ヲ完成セムトシアリ」ト放送セリ、當時ノ狀況ヨリスレバ敵軍ノ斯カ  
 ル企圖ハ必ズシモ不可能ニ非ズシテ、黄河渡船ハ往復ニ最少限三時間

要シ、數十萬ノ大軍ノ渡河ハ敵軍ノ追撃ヲ俟ツマデモ無ク、友軍ノ船  
 舶爭奪ノミニテモ混亂爲ルノ畏アリタリ、仍テ最高統帥部ハ背水ノ陣ヲ  
 敷クコトトセルガ、我ガ軍ノ戰ハ之ヲ契機トシテ變化セルナリ、因ヨ  
 リ爾初ト雖モ遊撃戰法論議セラレシモ之ヲ實施セシ言無カリシガ、右ハ  
 指揮官ノ大多數ヲ殲シド正規戰法ヲノミ習得シアリタルニ依ル、正規  
 戰ニ於ケル退却ハ正面ニ對シ直角ノ方向ナルガ、遊撃戰ニ於ケルソレハ  
 敵軍後方ヲ目指シ一定ノ角度方向無ク、從前ノ戰術中ニハ覓メ得ラレザル  
 ナリ、正規戰術ニ於テハ優勢ナル兵力ヲ有スル際ニ限リ攻撃ヲ行ヒ得ル  
 モノニシテ、中國古兵書ニ「十ナレバ之ヲ圍ミ五ナレバ之ヲ攻ム」ト見  
 ヲ、然レドモ遊撃隊ニ在リテハ優勢ナル兵力ヲ要セズ、敵一箇師團ニ對  
 シ我ガ方一團、一營、一連時トシテ一排、一班ナリトモ攻撃スルヲ得、  
 右ハ革命戰術ニシテ、若シ正規戰術ノミヲ遵奉スルトセバ當時ノ我ガ方  
 トシテハ戰鬪不能ナリシナリ  
 嘗見ヲ以テセバ正規戰ヨリ遊撃戰ヘノ移行ニ當リ我等ハ烈々タル革命精  
 神アルヲ要シ、而シテ後甫メテ此ノ種革命戰術ヲ運用スルコトヲ得、正

DE F DOC 350

規戰術ニ在リテハ兵力、裝備、素質等々相伯仲スルヲ要スルモ革命戰術  
 ニ在リテハ卻テ然ラズ、我々ノ今日遂行シアルハ民族革命戰爭ニシテ當  
 然革命戰術ナル一種獨特ノ戰術ヲ運用スベキナリ、中國ノ兵法上ニ觀テ  
 所ノ「騎兵」ハ弱點戰法上ノ所謂「小戰」ニシテ、斯カル騎兵乃至小戰  
 ノ戰法ハ山田ニ於テ出現セ餘儀無クセラレシモノニシテ、所謂窮スレバ  
 變ジ、變ジテ變ジ、變ズレバ悠久ニシテ、悠久ナレバ神明ナルノ理ニシ  
 軍事學モ固定不變ノモノニ非ズ、就中戰法ノ如キハ其ノ時其ノ地ニ依リ  
 變化極リ無シ、岳武穆曰ク「陣シテ後戰フハ兵法ノ常ナリ、運用ノ妙ハ  
 一心ニ存ス」ト、中國古代ノ名將ハ皆ニ岳武穆ニ止マラズ、孫臏ノ「十  
 增シテ羊人ニ勝テル」、韓信ノ「井陘ニ於テ背水ノ陣ヲ用ヒ之ヲ死地ニ置キ  
 テ而ル後生キ」、馬謖ノ「街亭ニ佈陣シ之ヲ死地ニ置キテ失敗セルガ如キ」、  
 悉ク兵法特異例ニシテ、兵法ノ時代ト共ニ變化スル證左タリ、「ナポレ  
 オン」ハ頭初ニ於テ連戰連勝セルガ右ハ時ニ應ジ十八世紀ノ陳腐ナル戰  
 術ヲ更改刷新セシコトニ依ルモノニシテ、其ノ晚年ニ於ケル失敗ハ獨  
 等ノ諸國モ漸次戰術更新ノ必要ヲ悟レルニ依ルナリ、現在我ガ方ハ全面的

LE F DOC 550

ニ游撃戰ニ終始シアルニアラズ、南嶽會議（譯者註、第二期抗戰方式ヲ決定セル會議）ニ依リ兵力ノ三分ノ一ヲ被占領區ニ入レテ游撃戰ヲ行ハシメ、三分ノ一ヲ京漢、粵漢線ノ前線ニ配シテ敵ニ對抗シ、殘餘ノ三分ノ一ヲ後方ニ置キテ並順訓練スルコトトナシアリ、委員長ノ南嶽會議訓詞中ニモ「游撃戰ハ正規戰ヨリモ重シト諭サレアルモ、其ノ真義ハ游撃戰ヲ以テ足レリトスルニ非ズシテ、諸氏ノ游撃戰ニ對スル注意ヲ喚起シ、之ヲ正規戰ニ巧ニ配合シ、正規戰原則ノヨリ有效ナル活用ヲ企圖セラレタルナリ

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1a78fc/>

not used

Def. Doc. # 350

正  
誤  
表

辯護側書證第三五〇號

第二、三、四頁六行目迄ハ削除下サイ

英文ハ四頁七行目柳州軍事會議開會訓詞ヨリ翻譯サレテキマスカラ  
御了承願ヒマス